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ABSTRACT 
 
Mobile money holds great financial inclusion promise, 
but also poses financial integrity challenges. The Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF)—the intergovernmental global 
anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist 
financing (CTF) standard-setting body—expressed support 
for financial inclusion and mobile money as a means to 
decrease the use of non-transparent cash in many 
developing countries. In February 2012, FATF adopted a 
new revised set of standards. This Article considers the 
impact of these new standards on mobile money models in 
developing countries. It highlights aspects of the new 
standards that would facilitate innovative mobile money 
models, but also points to questions and challenges. The 
new standards are generally more facilitative of new 
financial services models for the unbanked and 
underbanked, but a number of key questions and 
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implementation challenges remain. These include mobile 
money-related privacy and cyber-crime concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The international anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-
terrorist financing (CTF) standards set by the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) directly and indirectly guide the design of key 
elements of financial service delivery models.1 In the past few 
years, as an increasing number of countries adopted financial 
inclusion policies, it became evident that interpretations of these 
standards were negatively impacting initiatives to provide viable 
and appropriate financial services to consumers.2 In 2011 the 
1 FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE [FATF], INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON 
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM & 
PROLIFERATION: THE FATF RECOMMENDATIONS (2012), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF% 
20Recommendations%20(approved%20February%202012)%20reprint%20May
%202012%20web%20version.pdf [hereinafter FATF RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
2 Hennie Bester et al., Implementing FATF Standards in Developing 
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FATF adopted a guidance paper providing greater clarity about 
ways to align financial inclusion and sound AML/CTF policies. In 
February 2012, FATF’s support for financial inclusion was taken a 
few steps further when it adopted a new revised set of standards.3 
This Article focuses on the impact of these new standards on 
mobile money models in developing countries. It highlights 
aspects of the new standards that would facilitate innovative 
mobile money models, but also points to questions and challenges.  
The current AML/CTF standards framework in relation to 
mobile money is best understood against the backdrop of the pre-
2012 position. This Article therefore begins with a brief overview 
of the tensions between the FATF standards and innovative 
financial inclusion models. 
 
I. THE FATF AND ITS STANDARDS  
 
The FATF is an intergovernmental body that sets global AML, 
CTF, and proliferation financing (financing of weapons of mass 
destruction in contravention of United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions) (PF) standards. These standards, known as the FATF 
Recommendations, provide countries with benchmarks for AML, 
CTF, and PF laws, service provider practices, and international 
cooperation in criminal matters. The standards outline acts that 
every country should criminalize to meet the FATF objectives, and 
the client due diligence (CDD) measures that financial institutions 
should adopt to mitigate and respond to risks of money laundering 
(ML) and terror financing (TF) abuse. These CDD measures 
include identifying and verifying the identity of every client, 
monitoring the client’s transactions for unusual or suspicious 
activities, and reporting this information to a national financial 
intelligence unit. 
Countries and Financial Inclusion: Findings and Guidelines (World Bank First 
Initiative, Final Report, 2008), available at http://www.cenfri.org/documents/ 
AML/AML_CFT%20and%20Financial%20Inclusion.pdf. 
3 FATF, FATF GUIDANCE ON ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST 
FINANCING MEASURES AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION (2011) [hereinafter FATF 
2011 GUIDANCE], available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/ 
images/AML%20CFT%20measures%20and%20financial%20inclusion.pdf. 
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Despite its limited membership—by 2012 FATF had 34 
countries and two regional organizations as members—the FATF 
has been tremendously successful in positioning its standards as 
global standards: more than 180 countries endorse the FATF 
standards.4 This is remarkable, given that the FATF was created as 
a temporary task team in 1989 and has been operating under 
temporary mandates since its formation.5 One of the factors6 
underlying the FATF’s success as a standard-setting body is its 
system of mutual evaluation of compliance with the standards, 
coupled with indirect economic penalties for non-compliance. The 
compliance system extends to non-members. Non-compliance can 
expose a country to countermeasures by compliant countries and 
their financial institutions. In practice, these countermeasures mean 
that transactions and business relationships with persons from such 
jurisdictions are closely scrutinized. These countermeasures add to 
the costs of doing business with such countries, slow down the 
pace of transactions, and in many cases may even lead to a 
termination of business relationships.7 The FATF’s name-and-
shame campaign and the threat of economic penalties were 
sufficient not only to move countries towards compliance, but also 
to ensure that smaller regulators and many financial institutions 
reacted by adopting overly conservative rules and practices.8 
In the past years, increasing evidence emerged that FATF-
4 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 7. The fact that major 
countries such as India, Russia, and China endorsed the FATF 
Recommendations and amended their laws to meet the standards before gaining 
membership in the body bears testimony to the weight and impact of this body. 
5 The FATF’s current mandate was set in 2012 and will continue to 2020.  
6 Other factors—including its network of FATF-style regional bodies that 
provide non-FATF member countries limited opportunity to participate in and 
provide input into its processes, as well as the FATF’s range of observer 
bodies—also increase ownership of, and support for, their standards. 
7 INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF], ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND 
COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM (AML/CFT): REPORT ON THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM, 83-84 (2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2011/051111.pdf. 
8 Luis Urrutia Corral, FATF President at the XVII Caribbean Financial 
Action Task Force Council of Ministers Meeting (Nov. 5, 2010),  
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/fr/documents/repositoire/ 
reinforcingtheglobalamlcftstructure.html. 
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based rules and the conservative mindset of regulators were 
impeding innovative financial services models and channels. 
Transformational mobile money models, for instance, require a 
regulatory framework that allows accounts to be opened via mobile 
phones without contact with the service provider’s employees. 
Non-face-to-face engagement gives rise to identity fraud risks. 
These risks are higher in developing countries that lack national 
identification frameworks or other means to verify the identity of 
customers easily and securely. Furthermore, mobile money 
channels rely on large networks of agents, third-party service 
deliverers, and ATMs to provide cash-in and cash-out points. This 
introduces ML/FT risks and complicates the reporting of unusual 
and suspicious transactions. Regulators in many countries reacted 
with unease to proposed business models, concerned that the FATF 
may frown on the level of risk that such a model introduced. These 
concerns slowed down the design of appropriate regulatory 
frameworks for mobile money.9 
The FATF’s initial response was to defend its standards and to 
blame inappropriate, conservative responses on national 
regulators.10 The FATF pointed out that many of the concerns 
could be addressed if regulators applied a “risk-based approach” 
(RBA). The FATF’s 2003 Recommendations allowed countries 
and financial institutions to implement an RBA in relation to 
certain aspects of the AML/CTF framework. In terms of the 
FATF’s RBA, countries are allowed to exclude activity from 
9 See Louis de Koker, Money Laundering Control and Suppression of 
Financing of Terrorism: Some Thoughts on the Impact of Customer Due 
Diligence Measures on Financial Exclusion, 13 J. OF FIN. CRIME 26 (2006); 
Jennifer Isern & Louis de Koker, AML/CFT: Strengthening Financial Inclusion 
and Integrity (Consultative Grp. to Assist the Poor, Focus Note No. 56, 2009), 
available at http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.37862/; World Savings 
Banks Inst., Anti-Money Laundering and Combat Financing of Terrorism Rules 
and the Challenge of Financial Inclusion (World Savings Banks Inst., Position 
Paper Doc. 0565/09, 2009), available at http://www.wsbi.org/uploadedFiles/ 
Position_papers/0565%20updated.pdf; PIERRE-LAURENT CHATAIN ET AL., 
PROTECTING MOBILE MONEY AGAINST FINANCIAL CRIMES: GLOBAL POLICY 
CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS (2011) [hereinafter CHATAIN ET AL., PROTECTING 
MOBILE MONEY]. 
10 See, e.g., Paul Vlaanderen, FATF President, Speech at the ESAAMLG 
9th Council of Ministers Meeting (Aug. 21, 2009). 
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AML/CTF regulation where the activity was limited and posed a 
low level of ML/TF11 risk. Institutions were urged to consider 
adopting an RBA in terms of which customers, transactions, and 
services were divided into high-, standard-, and low-risk bands. 
Enhanced due diligence was required in cases where a high risk 
was identified. In cases where low risk was assessed, regulators 
could allow, and institutions could consider employing, simplified 
due diligence measures. 
While the basic principles of an RBA were clear, there was 
little agreement about appropriate risk assessment and risk 
mitigation measures and the extent to which an RBA could be 
implemented. Concern that the FATF may disagree with a 
particular interpretation and may list a country as non-compliant 
impeded the implementation of robust RBA frameworks in many 
smaller countries. In 2007 the FATF began to issue guidance on 
the RBA for regulated institutions, professions, and businesses.12 
The guidance was helpful, but focused mainly on the identification 
and mitigation of higher ML-risk; it shed little light on the 
management of low-risk scenarios and an RBA in relation to TF 
risk.13 Financial inclusion models typically focus on small, low-
value transactions. If they could be classified as a “low risk” 
transaction, many potential clients could be serviced despite their 
lack of formal identification documentation. 
In 2010 the FATF, under the Mexican presidency, recognized 
that regulators required more certainty before they would take 
11 FATF refers to “ML/TF risk” but, as discussed in Section II.A, the RBA 
does not fully extend to TF risk. It is also important to note that the RBA does 
not extend to PF risk. 
12 See e.g., FATF, GUIDANCE ON THE RISK-BASED APPROACH TO 
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING: HIGH LEVEL 
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES (2007), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ 
media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%20Principles%20and%20Procedu
res.pdf [hereinafter FATF 2007 GUIDANCE]. 
13 Louis de Koker, Identifying and Managing Low Money Laundering Risk: 
Perspectives on FATF’s Risk-Based Guidance, 16 J. OF FIN. CRIME 334 (2009) 
[hereinafter de Koker, Identifying]; Louis de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money 
Laundering, Combating of Financing of Terror and Financial Inclusion: 
Questions to Consider when FATF Standards are Clarified, 18 J. OF FIN. CRIME 
361 (2011) [hereinafter de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money Laundering]. 
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bolder action to implement an RBA that would support financial 
inclusion. Following a consultative process, the FATF issued a 
non-binding guidance paper on financial inclusion in 2011.14 
These developments were not only the result of increased 
international support for financial inclusion, but were also linked to 
increased FATF concern about the integrity risk of financial 
exclusion (i.e., the risk that persons may not use the formal 
financial system and thereby limit the reach and effectiveness of 
AML/CFT controls to mitigate financial integrity risks in the 
economy as a whole).  
The FATF’s financial inclusion guidance paper highlighted 
steps that countries could take to align financial inclusion and 
AML/CFT policies. The guidance paper also listed various country 
examples without necessarily endorsing those as FATF-compliant. 
The discussions that led to the adoption of the guidance paper 
informed the drafting of the revised FATF Recommendations that 
were adopted in February 2012. Unlike the guidance paper, the 
Recommendations are binding and hierarchically superior to 
guidance papers. It is therefore expected that the financial 
inclusion paper will be revisited to clarify some aspects and ensure 
that the guidance reflects the current Recommendations. During 
the course of 2012 the FATF will also revisit its mutual evaluation 
methodology. This methodology guides the country reviewers 
when they produce a country compliance report in relation to the 
FATF standards. Regulators will study the new methodology with 
interest as it will set out the questions that country assessors have 
to ask. These questions are often of greater relevance to the design 
of compliant regulatory models than the broad statements of the 
Recommendations themselves. It is expected that the measure to 
evaluate appropriate risk-based responses will feature prominently 
in the new methodology. 
With this brief background, this Article turns its attention to 
aspects of the new revised Recommendations that are particularly 
relevant to mobile money. 
 
 
14 FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3.  
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II. 2012 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS:  
MOBILE MONEY PERSPECTIVES 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
The 2012 Recommendations are revised Recommendations. 
They are in essence refined versions of the AML 
Recommendations that were initially adopted in 1990 and revised 
extensively in 2003, as well as the FATF’s Special 
Recommendations on Terrorist Financing that it adopted from 
2001. The intention was not to effect a radical change, but rather to 
clarify the existing Recommendations, strengthen their 
consistency, and address issues that lowered compliance levels of 
countries. While the texts of many Recommendations were not 
changed, the Recommendations were restructured and refined. The 
forty Recommendations on Money Laundering and the nine 
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing were 
consolidated into a single text of forty Recommendations, 
accompanied by an expanded glossary and interpretive notes to 
key Recommendations. As a result, the numbering of the 
Recommendations changed (for example, the text of former 
Recommendation 5 that addresses CDD is now found in 
Recommendation 10) and some of the text of a few 
Recommendations was moved to the interpretative notes. 
Examples were added to the glossary and the interpretative notes to 
explain aspects of the standards. These examples are not 
mandatory but merely illustrative. 
In 2008 the FATF’s mandate was expanded to address [full 
name] (PF). The 2012 Recommendations, unlike their 
predecessors, therefore explicitly address proliferation and require 
countries to implement targeted financial sanctions to comply with 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating 
to the prevention, suppression, and disruption of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and its financing.15 These resolutions 
target proliferation activities of specific states, for example through 
targeted financial sanctions. The resolutions also aim to prevent 
15 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 13 (Rec. 7). 
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non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, for 
example by requiring criminalization of acts such as the 
manufacture, acquisition, use, or transport of nuclear, chemical, or 
biological weapons, including the financing of such activities. The 
FATF’s focus on proliferation is, however, not well defined. The 
FATF’s guidance focuses mainly on PF, but the wording of the key 
anti-proliferation recommendation, Recommendation 7, extends it 
to also include broader anti-proliferation measures in terms of the 
UNSCRs. In addition, the concept of “PF” itself is quite broad; and 
the FATF has not agreed on a working definition for its own 
purposes.16 Clarity is important because regulators and regulated 
entities, including mobile money providers, are expected to meet 
the FATF standards on AML/CTF as well as PF. 
The RBA is a particularly prominent and now mandatory 
feature of the 2012 Recommendations. This approach is of key 
importance to mobile money and other financial inclusion 
initiatives. 
 
B.  The 2012 RBA Principles 
 
Recommendation 1 addresses risk assessment and the RBA 
principles that countries and institutions should implement.  
The RBA is now mandatory for countries and institutions, but 
it is important to note that its application is limited to specific 
aspects of the AML/CTF framework. It can be used to expand or 
contract the regulatory sphere or to determine the nature of CDD 
measures to be implemented in respect of specific client, products 
or services. However, it cannot be used to argue that a country’s 
overall ML/TF risk is so low that it does not need to criminalize 
ML or TF. The RBA furthermore only extends to aspects of 
ML/TF, but leaves PF untouched. 
The cornerstone of the RBA is risk assessment. Under 
Recommendation 1 countries are expected to “identify, assess and 
understand” their ML/TF risks. That assessment will then inform 
appropriate risk mitigation measures. Countries should apply an 
RBA to ensure that the risk mitigation measures are commensurate 
16 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1. 
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with the risks identified. Countries should also require their 
AML/CTF-regulated institutions to undertake risk assessments to 
mitigate their institutional ML/TF risks. Those institutional risk 
assessments should in turn be informed by the country’s risk 
assessment. Institutions should furthermore be required to adopt an 
RBA when they determine the extent of their CDD measures. 
Where countries identify higher risks, they should adopt 
enhanced risk mitigation measures to ensure that the risks are 
adequately addressed. Where countries identify lower risks, they 
may—in strictly limited circumstances and where there is a proven 
low risk of ML/TF—elect not to impose AML/CFT obligations on 
institutions and businesses that should otherwise be regulated. 
They may also allow regulated businesses to implement simplified 
CDD in respect of low-risk clients, products and services. 
Simplified measures are, however, optional and conditional, while 
enhanced measures are mandatory where risks are high. In 
addition, the FATF has been cautious to ensure that country RBAs 
do not undermine key features of the AML/CTF system. The 
FATF has therefore set specific CDD measures in relation to types 
of clients, relationships, and activities that it deems as posing a 
universally high risk. The FATF does not allow countries to adjust 
that rating or the required risk mitigation measures even if certain 
types of clients, relationships, and activities pose a lower risk in a 
particular national context. Politically exposed persons17 and 
money or value transfer services are examples of customers and 
activities with set measures that should be applied. 
The national RBA is mirrored in the RBA that is envisaged at 
an institutional level. Institutions must be required to assess their 
ML/TF risks and adopt prescribed or enhanced risk mitigation 
measures where risk is assessed or indicated as high. If the risk 
assessment presents an “adequate analysis” of risk,18 regulators 
17 Politically exposed persons (PEPs) are generally defined as people who 
are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions by a foreign country, 
for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior 
government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state-owned 
corporations, or important political party officials. PEPs, their family members, 
and close business associates may pose a corruption risk. 
18 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 64. 
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may permit institutions to adopt simplified measures where risks 
are assessed as low; however, simplified measures are not 
appropriate when there is a suspicion of ML/TF.19  
The Interpretive Note to Recommendation 10 provides far 
greater clarity than before about the RBA in relation to lower-risk 
products. The Interpretative Note lists non-binding examples of 
potentially lower-risk scenarios in relation to customers, country 
and regions and products, services and delivery channels. One of 
the examples is “financial products or services that provide 
appropriately defined and limited services to certain types of 
customers, so as to increase access for financial inclusion 
purposes.”20 
The Interpretative Note also provides more guidance regarding 
simplified CDD measures. Examples of possible measures include: 
verification of the customer and the beneficial owner identity after 
the establishment of the business relationship (for instance when 
transaction amounts exceed a defined monetary threshold); a 
reduction in the frequency of customer identification updates; or 
limited on-going monitoring of low-value transactions. The 
measures adopted must however be commensurate with the lower-
risk factors. Whenever there is a suspicion of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, or where “specific higher-risk scenarios 
apply,”21 such simplified measures are not appropriate. 
The meaning of “specific higher-risk scenarios,”22 is not quite 
clear. The phrase only appears in the discussion of low risk and 
simplified due diligence; it is not used elsewhere in the text of the 
Recommendations. Apparently the intention was to refer to the 
specific customers and activities where additional measures are 
required by the Recommendations, in other words, the matters 
addressed by Recommendations 12 to 16: politically exposed 
persons (PEPs); correspondent banking; money or value transfer 
services; and new technologies and wire transfers. The specific 
rules and procedures envisaged in these Recommendations 
therefore must be applied and cannot be simplified on the strength 
19 Id. at 31. 
20 Id. at 64. 
21 Id. at 66.  
22 Id. 
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of an institutional RBA, even though the institutional risk levels 
relating to those matters are very low. One implication is that 
mobile money providers should have appropriate risk management 
systems to determine whether a customer is a foreign PEP (one of 
the measures stipulated in Recommendation 12) and cannot 
dispense with such measures merely because their risk assessment 
reflects their PEP risk exposure as very low. This limitation 
compels providers to adopt risk mitigation measures that are 
disproportionate to the actual risk and runs counter to the 
regulatory principle of proportionality.23  
Although the revised Recommendations improved the 
coherency of the RBA framework, some inconsistencies remain. 
Institutions are for instance compelled to undertake CDD in 
respect of business relationships, irrespective of value, but are not 
compelled to implement these measures in relation to non-account-
based occasional transactions under US$/€15,000. Where an 
institution assesses its low-value account-based product as posing a 
low risk of abuse, it is still required to implement CDD measures, 
although they may be simplified. Many low-value financial 
inclusion accounts may never have a total amount of US$/€15,000 
processed through them. Yet, the framework covers those 
accounts. Meanwhile a single transaction that involves 
US$/€14,000 is not required to be subjected to the FATF-
envisaged CDD measures. 
The RBA has furthermore not been extended to all CDD 
aspects. For example, it does not extend to the duty to determine 
whether clients were designated under UNSCRs for CTF purposes. 
This determination must be made irrespective of the degree of risk 
of doing business with a designated person under the name or 
names identified in terms of the UNSCR schemes.24 The PF 
measures have also been excluded from the RBA. Institutions will 
23 Global Standard-Setting Bodies and Financial Inclusion for the Poor: 
Toward Proportionate Standards and Guidance (Global P’ship for Fin. 
Inclusion, White Paper, 2011), available at http://www.gpfi.org/knowledge-
bank/publications/global-standard-setting-bodies-and-financial-inclusion-poor. 
24 The FATF view is that compliance with sanctions (i.e., identification of 
clients as designated persons for TF or WMD purposes) is not a function of risk. 
See FATF 2007 GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 8.  
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therefore need to perform standard name-matching tests to 
compare client names with the listed names of UNSCR-designated 
persons as well as PEPs, even though their chances of transacting 
with such a person are assessed as very slim.25 
Despite these inconsistencies, the FATF’s RBA can be very 
helpful in removing FATF-related barriers to financial inclusion. 
Underlying this approach however, is an assumption that 
institutions will assess risks correctly and adopt simplified CDD 
when risks are assessed as low. The large-scale closure of accounts 
of Money Service Businesses by banks in response to often 
unfounded risk concerns has shown that this is not necessarily the 
case.26 Conservative institutions tend to overestimate risk and 
avoid it or adopt over-designed controls.27 Conduct of regulators 
and supervisors, such as harsh compliance enforcement action, 
may exacerbate this behavior. Adoption of simplified CDD 
measures is optional, but if institutions fail to do so when 
appropriate, financial inclusion can be undermined and financial 
exclusion risk would rise. Regulators have furthermore indicated 
that they are reluctant to intervene and force adoption of simplified 
measures where institutions decide that more stringent measures 
should be applied. It will therefore be vital for regulators and 
supervisors to create environments where institutions can assess 
and respond correctly to the different risk levels. 
 
C.  Other Relevant Measures 
 
A number of other Recommendations are also relevant to 
mobile money. 
Recommendation 15, for example, requires countries and 
financial institutions to identify and assess the ML/TF risks that 
25 See Section III.B for questions regarding the value of these processes 
when CDD is simplified. 
26 Bester et al., supra note 2, at 158-62. 
27 Louis de Koker & John Symington, Conservative Compliance Behaviour: 
Drivers of Conservative Compliance Responses in the South African Financial 
Services Industry (FinMark Trust, 2011), available at http://www.mfw4a.org/ 
documents-details/conservative-compliance-behavior-drivers-of-conservative-
compliance-responses-in-the-south-african-financial-services-industry.html. 
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may arise in relation to: (a) the development of new products and 
business practices, including new delivery mechanisms; and (b) the 
use of new or developing technologies for both new and pre-
existing products. This recommendation tightens the wording of its 
2003 predecessor by linking it directly to the RBA.28 Although this 
Recommendation is relevant to mobile money, it is largely 
superfluous in view of the more comprehensive and fundamental 
obligation of countries and financial institutions to assess all their 
ML/TF risks and to manage them appropriately. 
The Recommendations addressing money or value transfer 
service (MVTS) and wire transfers are of greater relevance. An 
MVTS is defined in the glossary as referring to financial services 
that involve the acceptance of cash, checks, other monetary 
instruments, or other stores of value and the payment of a 
corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary by means 
of a communication, message, transfer, or through a clearing 
network to which the MVTS provider belongs. Mobile money is an 
MVTS for purposes of the FATF standards.29 
In terms of Recommendation 14, providers of MVTS must be 
licensed or registered and subject to effective systems for 
monitoring and ensuring compliance with the relevant FATF 
measures.30 An exception is a financial institution that is already 
licensed and registered as such, allowed to offer MVTS and 
subject to the full range of applicable FATF measures.31 Mobile 
money account providers that are not licensed as such, for example 
28 See FATF, FATF 40 RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (Rec. 8) (2003), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FATF%20Standards%20-
%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf. In one respect a key measure of 
support for mobile money was weakened. The 2003 Recommendations urged 
countries “to encourage the development of modern and secure techniques of 
money management that are less vulnerable to money laundering.” Id. at 9 (Rec. 
20). This has now fallen away. 
29 As in the 2003 set, MVTS as well as issuers and managers of means of 
payment (e.g., credit and debit cards, checks, traveler’s checks, money orders 
and bankers’ drafts, electronic money) are also defined as “financial 
institutions” for purposes of the FATF standards. 
30 This is echoed in Recommendation 26, but that Recommendation requires 
regulation and supervision to ensure compliance with national AML/CFT 
standards.  
31 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 69. 
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a telecommunications company, should therefore be licensed or 
registered to deliver such services. Any natural or legal person 
working as an agent for an account provider should also be 
licensed or registered by a competent authority, or the MVTS 
provider should maintain a current list of its agents accessible by 
competent authorities in the countries in which the MVTS provider 
and its agents operate.32 Those agents should be included in the 
AML/CFT programs of providers and should also be monitored for 
compliance with those programs.33 
MVTS providers are furthermore required to comply with the 
relevant requirements of Recommendation 16 in the countries in 
which they operate, whether directly or through their agents.34 
Recommendation 16 requires MVTS providers to include specific 
and accurate originator (sender) information, and required 
beneficiary information, in their wire transfers messages, and to 
ensure that the information remains with the wire transfer or 
related message throughout the payment chain. They must 
furthermore ensure that they can take freezing action or prevent 
prohibited transactions when required by relevant UNSCRs on 
CFT or PF.35 
While Recommendation 16 gives rise to extensive general 
compliance obligations,36 it alleviates the overall compliance 
32 Id. at 17 (Rec. 14). 
33 Id. 
34 There are some exceptions for example payments for goods or services 
using a credit, debit or prepaid card for the purchase of goods or services, as 
long as the card number accompanies all transfers flowing from the transaction. 
Person-to-person transfers using those cards as a payment system are, however, 
included in Recommendation 16. See id. at 70.  
35 Confusingly the text of Recommendation 16 makes explicit reference to 
CFT only. However, it refers to sanctions against “designated persons and 
entities” and the definition of this concept in the glossary extends to targeted 
financial sanctions to support the control of WMD. See Section III.B for some 
practical difficulties that may arise regarding freezing of assets when 
identification requirements are simplified. 
36 For example, cross-border wire transfers “should always contain: the 
name of the originator; the originator account number where such an account is 
used to process the transaction; the originator’s address, or national identity 
number, or customer identification number, or date and place of birth; the name 
of the beneficiary; and the beneficiary account number where such an account is 
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burden by means of a few pragmatic exceptions and rules, for 
example: 
 Ordering financial institutions need not verify the identity 
of both parties to the transfer service. However, they must 
verify the sender’s identity and information while receiving 
institutions must verify the information of the beneficiary. 
 Domestic wire transfers should also include extensive 
originator information, unless this information can be made 
available to the beneficiary financial institution and 
appropriate authorities by other means. In that case, the 
institution need only include the account number or a 
unique transaction reference number that will enable the 
transaction to be traced back to the originator or the 
beneficiary. 
 Countries may adopt simplified identification requirements 
in relation to cross-border wire transfers involving amounts 
below US$/€1,000.37 Simplified measures may allow party 
information to be limited to the name of the originator; the 
name of the beneficiary; and an account number for each, 
or a unique transaction reference number. This information 
need not be verified, unless there is a suspicion of ML/TF, 
in which case, each relevant financial institution should 
verify the information pertaining to its customer.38 
From a mobile money perspective, these rules and exceptions 
are especially helpful in relation to domestic, low-value wire 
transfers. However, as transaction values increase, the exceptions  
 
used to process the transaction. In the absence of an account, a unique 
transaction reference number should be included which permits traceability of 
the transaction.” FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 71. 
37 The 2012 duty is more onerous than before. In terms of the previous 
standards, wire transfers below US$/€1,000 could be exempted from CDD 
requirements. Id. 
38 It is not clear how this will be communicated between the two institutions 
or how the ordering institution will be able to comply, if they had no suspicion 
when receiving the funds but the suspicion was formed by the receiving 
institution. 
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will no longer apply and the standard requirements will have to be 
met.  
The FATF standards also require service providers to report 
transactions that are suspected of involving ML/TF to the national 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).39 Where a mobile money 
operator controls both the ordering and the beneficiary side of a 
wire transfer,40 the Interpretative Note to Recommendation 16 
requires the operator to consider all the information received from 
both the ordering and beneficiary sides to determine whether a 
suspicious transaction report (STR) must be filed. The report 
should be filed in any country affected by the suspicious wire 
transfer, and relevant transaction information should be made 
available to the FIU.  
The record-keeping standards are also relevant to the mobile 
money framework. Countries are required to ensure that financial 
institutions maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records 
on transactions, both domestic and international, in order to 
provide transactional forensic information to law enforcement.41 
This duty extends to all records obtained through CDD measures, 
such as copies or records of identification documents (e.g., 
passports, identity cards, driving licenses, or similar documents), 
business correspondence, and internal notes on CDD in respect of 
each client. The records must be kept for at least five years after 
the business relationship comes to an end, or after the date of the 
occasional transaction.  
While record-keeping has been a standard FATF obligation 
since 1990, it was broadened in 2012. Pre-2012, institutions were 
required to keep CDD records up to date. This duty has now been 
extended to documents collected under CDD processes. Financial 
institutions are required to ensure that documents, data or 
information collected under the CDD process is kept up to date and 
relevant by undertaking reviews of existing records, particularly 
for higher-risk categories of customers.42 Valid identification 
39 Recommendation 20 does not explicitly extend to PF transactions. FATF 
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 19.  
40 Id. at 73.  
41 Id. at 15 (Rec. 11). 
42 Id. at 66. 
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documents with expiry dates may need to be reviewed in the future 
to ensure that a copy of the current, unexpired document is on file. 
South Africa, for example, extended this obligation in 2010 to 
refugees. Refugees there obtain temporary government-issued 
identification documentation. Banks were instructed to ensure that 
refugee accounts are frozen when their identification document 
expires and that they should only be unfrozen when the client 
presents a new, valid temporary document.43 In South Africa this 
principle would also extend to other documents that have 
temporary validity such as drivers’ licenses and passports that are 
valid for fixed periods. A similarly strict interpretation of the 
FATF duty to keep documents up to date and relevant will lead to 
substantial increase in compliance obligations and potential 
hardship for many clients. 
With this brief overview of key mobile money AML/CTF 
requirements under the new standards, this Article turns to risk 
assessment and mitigation. 
 
III.  RISK IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT, AND MITIGATION 
 
The FATF’s RBA enables regulators and mobile money 
providers to shape aspects of an AML/CTF risk control framework 
to better align financial inclusion and financial integrity objectives. 
A sound RBA is informed by risk assessments that present an 
“adequate analysis of the risk.”44 Proportional controls that 
mitigate the risks must then be designed, implemented, monitored 
and, where required, amended to manage the identified risks. Risk 
assessments must be revisited to ensure that assessments remain 
current and comprehensive. Superficially this may appear 
relatively easy, but important questions and challenges arise. 
 
 
43 Louis de Koker, Will RICA’s Customer Identification Data Meet Anti-
Money Laundering Requirements and Facilitate the Development of 
Transformational Mobile Banking in South Africa? (FinMark Trust, Exploratory 
Note, 2010), available at http://www.cenfri.org/documents/Financial% 
20inclusion/2010/RICA%20impact%20on%20financial%20inclusion_final.pdf. 
44 FATF RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 1, at 64. 
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A.  Conceptual Uncertainties 
 
The FATF has not yet been able to reach consensus about the 
definition of risk. Given the RBA’s centrality to the new FATF 
framework, the absence of a consensus about this key concept is 
somewhat ironic.45 From a practical perspective it undermines the 
conceptual framework and uniformity required to ensure that 
country and institutional risk assessments inform one another. 
There are of course globally accepted definitions of risk. The 
ISO 31000 (2009)/ISO Guide 73:2002, for example, define risk as 
the “effect of uncertainty on objectives.”46 But there is not full 
agreement within the FATF that this definition is applicable to its 
RBA.  
To add to the confusion, the risk questions that AML/CFT 
stakeholders pose may differ. Institutions often focus on ML/TF 
abuses that may render them liable, for example, by exposing them 
to fines for non-compliance with the law, or that may expose them 
to reputational risk. This is often the case where compliance 
officers lead the risk assessment processes. Regulators, on the 
other hand, require institutions to invest money to assess the 
likelihood of an abuse of their services or products for ML/TF 
purposes. Some of these transactions may hold little or no risk of 
direct negative financial impact on the institution and may even be 
profitable for the institution.47 In short, institutions are concerned 
45 de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money Laundering, supra note 13, at 370. 
46 “International risk management standards define risk as a function of the 
likelihood of occurrence and the consequence of risk events, where likelihood of 
occurrence is a function of the coexistence of threat and vulnerability. In other 
words, risk events occur when a threat exploits vulnerability. Formally, R, a 
jurisdiction’s level of ML risk, can be represented as: R = f [(T), (V)] x C, where 
T represents threat, V represents vulnerability, and C represents consequence. 
Accordingly, the level of risk can be mitigated by reducing the size of the 
threats, vulnerabilities, or their consequences.” IMF, supra note 7, at 64.  
47 The Australian regulator, for example, require reporting institutions to 
have an AML/CTF program to identify, mitigate and manage the risk of money 
laundering or terrorism financing that a reporting entity may reasonably face in 
providing designated services at or through a permanent establishment in 
Australia. See, e.g., Australian Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism 
Financing Act § 84(2) (2006), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/ 
C2012C00375/Html/Text#_Toc321138619. 
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about the risk that employees may collude with criminals and 
facilitate money laundering or commit other breaches of the law 
that may render the institution liable or may cause damage to its 
reputation. They are not necessarily as concerned about a 
transaction that involves proceeds of crime of which its employees 
were unaware and where reasonable controls could not have 
prevented it. These transactions concern the regulator and the 
policymaker but not necessarily the institution, as chances of legal 
liability or reputational damage is small. While the institution may 
undertake a comprehensive risk assessment, its natural concerns 
and interests may skew the assessment.  
Regulators may also have a more limited risk focus than often 
assumed in FATF discussions. A regulator may impose controls to 
keep proceeds of crime out of its regulated industry, despite the 
fact that it may move tainted funds to another regulated industry—
where it becomes the concern of another regulator—or into the 
grey economy or to a neighboring country.  
Policymakers generally have a broader perspective, but 
AML/CFT policymakers have not always been sensitive to the 
potential of money moving out of the formal economy into the 
informal economy or being trapped in that part of the economy. 
The FATF has also not yet determined whether to focus on the 
integrity of financial services or on the integrity of the economy, 
non-financial and non-formal, as a whole.48 Since 2001 it has 
focused on informal remittances, but not to the same extent on 
other informal financial services. Since 2011, however, it has 
voiced its concern about financial exclusion risks of people being 
forced or electing to transact using informal financial services, 
thereby limiting the reach and effectiveness of AML/CTF controls. 
Thus, the interplay between controls that preserve the integrity of 
formal financial services and those that push criminal activity into 
the underground economy requires far more FATF attention. This 
is even more important given that the 2012 FATF framework also 
extends to proceeds of tax crimes. The interplay between strict 
FATF-related controls and the movement of money in and to the  
 
48 de Koker, Aligning Anti-Money Laundering, supra note 13. 
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shadow or underground economy requires more attention than it 
received in the past. 
Whether the assessment should gauge the risk of “substantial” 
or “significant” abuse—and the meaning of these terms would be 
debatable—or the risk of any abuse, however insignificant, has 
also not been settled. Generally the focus in respect to ML is on 
more significant abuse, measured by transactional value. More 
attention is therefore given to high-value transactions. Lower-value 
transactions, such as non-account-based transactions under 
US$/€15,000, may not be subject to any customer due diligence 
controls. The FATF, however, recognizes that small, low-value 
transactions may be relevant from a TF perspective.49 Two 
observations are relevant in this regard: (1) What poses a low risk 
from an ML perspective may not pose a low risk from a TF 
perspective, and institutions can only simplify CDD measures if 
both ML and TF risk levels are assessed as low; and (2) no 
provider of mass transaction services can state with confidence that 
the chances of processing one low-value transaction that indirectly 
supports a terrorist is low, especially when the country has even 
limited levels of TF risk. Statistically, the risk will increase as its 
business grows. A risk assessment that focuses on the chances of 
any TF abuse, however small, will therefore not tend to rate any 
risk as low.  
Given that national risk assessments have to inform industry 
risk assessments and institutional risk assessments, the lack of 
conceptual clarity and commonality complicates discussions. In 
addition, the concept of “risk appetite” or “risk sensitivity” has not 
been sufficiently raised. Assessors are required to assess risk and 
to classify them into categories of “high” and “low” risk. That 
classification depends heavily on the assessors’ view of risk and of 
the benefit to be obtained when the risk is embraced. A person 
with a low-risk appetite would not tend to classify any risks as low, 
while one with a high-risk appetite would hold a different view. 
The FATF examples provide some guidance as to potential low-
risk scenarios, but risk ratings depend very much on the context of 
49 See FATF 2007 GUIDANCE, supra note 12, at 8; de Koker, Identifying, 
supra note 13, at 343-47; FATF 2011 GUIDANCE, supra note 3, at 19. 
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the assessment and the examples are not absolute or binding. 
Institutions cannot be expected to assess this risk correctly and 
confidently without guidance from their governments, and in many 
developing countries little guidance has been forthcoming.  
 
B.  Risk Assessment and Controls 
 
Despite these uncertainties, a number of mobile money risk 
assessment models were developed to assist regulators and 
providers in undertaking risk assessments. 
The World Bank, for example, identified four key ML/TF risk 
factors in relation to mobile money: anonymity (anonymous 
usage); elusiveness (ability to avoid the identification and tracing 
of parties to the transaction); rapidity (the speed of transacting); 
and poor oversight (limited regulation and supervision).50 The 
Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA) uses a risk 
assessment methodology constructed around these factors and 
assesses ML/TF risks that may stem from customers, merchants 
and retailers or agents, or that may stem from cross-border 
functionality.51 The FATF developed a risk matrix identifying risk 
factors, risk mitigants, and potential risk levels in relation to new 
payment methodologies, including mobile money. The work that 
commenced in 200652 was further refined in 2010.53 In 2010 the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also 
produced a comprehensive mobile financial services matrix that 
50 Pierre-Laurent Chatain et al., Integrity in Mobile Phone Financial 
Services: Measures for Mitigating Risks from Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing 13 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 146, 2008), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAML/Resources/WP146_Web.pdf; 
CHATAIN ET AL., PROTECTING MOBILE MONEY, supra note 9, at 37-38. 
51 Marina Solin & Andrew Zerzan, Mobile Money: Methodology for 
Assessing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks (Groupe Speciale 
Mobile Ass’n, Discussion Paper, 2009), available at http://www.gsma.com/ 
developmentfund/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/amlfinal35.pdf. 
52 FATF, REPORT ON NEW PAYMENT METHODS (2006), available at 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Report%20on%20New% 
20Payment%20Methods.pdf.  
53 FATF, MONEY LAUNDERING USING NEW PAYMENT METHODS (2010), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/ML% 
20using%20New%20Payment%20Methods.pdf. 
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includes an assessment of financial crime risks.54 
While these methodologies are helpful, they still need to be 
applied sensibly in each country and in relation to specific products 
in order to identify the relevant risks and to respond appropriately 
to each. This exercise is complicated by the fact that risk control 
measures themselves may produce risks that must be adequately 
addressed. Client identification processes, for example, increase 
the risk of data theft. In other cases they raise questions regarding 
the sensibility of the standard control measures that institutions are 
compelled to adopt. 
For example, in a lower-risk context client identification may 
be simplified and verification may be postponed. On the other 
hand, service providers are required to scan names of clients 
against UNSCR lists of terrorists and persons associated with 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Where a name match 
occurs, the transaction must be frozen. An investigation must be 
undertaken to determine whether the party to the transaction was 
the party listed by the relevant UNSCR. If not, the money can be 
released. Scanning and processes to ensure that such transactions 
are frozen add compliance costs to the business model. These costs 
may be disproportionate to the benefits in cases where simplified 
identification and verification measures are adopted. In essence, 
the benefit would be limited to the cases where a listed person uses 
his or her listed name to conclude such a transaction. That would 
be highly unlikely, especially as the simplified identification 
measures may not be sufficiently robust to compel such a person to 
use their actual name. Simplified identification measures also 
increase costs to investigate cases where name-matching occurs. 
The provider cannot undertake an appropriate background check 
based on the client information that it holds to determine whether 
or not it is a false match. The investigation itself may prove very 
difficult in a developing country environment. An innocent 
consumer would also bear some of the impact, having the 
transaction frozen until it can be established that the match was 
false. In essence, the measures will pose a burden for providers and 
54 U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES RISK 
MATRIX (2010), available at http://bizclir.com/galleries/publications/Mobile% 
20Financial%20Services%20Risk%20Matrix%20July%202010.pdf. 
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for customers whose names happen to match those of persons who 
were listed, but it will not be effective to prevent the listed persons 
from using the services. 
A number of risk-control models suggest controlling the risks 
introduced by simplified identification measures through enhanced 
monitoring of transactions. Transactions are monitored to identify 
unusual transaction patterns. Monitoring is more effective when 
institutions know enough about their clients to identify when a 
client acts contrary to his or her normal or expected pattern of 
behavior. The less an institution knows about a client, the less 
value standard-monitoring processes may produce. Closer 
monitoring may in fact just generate longer lists of potentially 
unusual or suspicious transactions that do not lend themselves to 
further investigation.  
Many standard low-risk controls, especially transaction and 
balance limits, are based on assumptions that they lower the 
usefulness of the product for ML or TF abuse. However, an 
increasing number of cases are emerging where criminals are 
patient and work in groups to abuse these products to launder 
money.55 While the incidence of abuse may therefore be higher 
than anticipated, the total amounts involved in these abuses should 
generally be far lower than amounts laundered through standard 
and higher-risk products. The ML risk may therefore still be 
regarded as low compared to other products, but whether the same 
can be said of TF risk is unclear.56 Simplified control measures, 
however, tend to attract abuse; and it is realistic to expect that 
abuse of these products will increase in future. 
 
C.  Risk Assessment and Cross-Border Services 
 
 It is challenging to undertake an assessment of a particular 
product’s AML/CTF risk. The challenges multiply when the 
mobile money model attempts to operate cross-border and the 
assessment, and controls must satisfy different regulators working 
55 Isern & de Koker, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing micro and nano-
structuring, i.e. splitting large amounts of dirty money into small or very small 
transactions). See also Section IV.A for the 2012 PostBank fraud. 
56 See also Section III.A.   
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within different national legal frameworks. In many cases the 
countries may not share the same definition of ML/TF offenses. 
The FATF provides a flexible framework allowing countries to 
determine, for example, whether money laundering offenses can be 
committed negligently or only intentionally and whether it extends 
to proceeds of all crimes or only to proceeds of specific serious 
offences. Legal differences such as these, combined with different 
national crime and law enforcement environments, mean that a 
product may be assessed as posing a low risk in one country if 
offered only in that country, but may have a higher risk profile in 
another country if it operates across borders. 
Encouraging developments in this context are comprised in the 
Southern African Development Community’s attempt to 
coordinate the development of ML laws among its members to 
support the development of cross-border financial services in the 
region.57 Greater legal uniformity will also support a regional RBA 
approach. 
 
IV.  BROADER INTEGRITY RISKS 
 
Much of the current integrity attention is devoted to ML/TF 
risk assessment and mitigation. However, broader, non-ML/TF-
specific financial integrity risks of mobile money should also 
receive attention. This Article closes with a brief overview of some 
concerns regarding cybercrime and surveillance. 
 
A.  Cybercrime 
 
Mobile money uses high-technology channels that are designed 
to be secure to the extent that the service provider can mitigate 
risks. However, there are also risks that originate on the user side. 
If the client fails to protect secure access details or if a virus infects 
the phone, the client is exposed to risk. Viruses pose an increasing 
risk as cheap smartphones spread through developing countries. 
57 See S. AFR. DEV. CMTY., PROTOCOL ON FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 19 
(ch. 8) (2006), available at http://www.sadc.int/files/2913/2634/9829/ 
PROTOCOL_ON_FINANCE_AND_INVESTMENT_-_18_AUGUST_2006-
FINAL.pdf. 
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Ensuring that new users protect their access details and removing 
viruses from phones in remote rural areas where technical 
expertise is limited are challenging. This provides criminals and 
terrorists with new ways to profit from crime and to disrupt 
systems. 
As mobile money networks and providers grow, employee risk 
also increases. Low-value accounts of the South African PostBank 
were, for example, targeted in a sophisticated theft on New Year’s 
Day in 2012. Although facts are still emerging, it appears that an 
organized crime group opened 103 small accounts in false names 
over a long period. This was done despite the fact that PostBank 
subjects all its clients to CDD processes before opening an 
account. The criminals also bribed an employee who was able to 
obtain security codes and could access the bank’s transactional 
control systems to identify accounts with large balances. The 
syndicate then raised the daily withdrawal limits on the false 
accounts to about US$55,000 per day, transferred money from the 
large accounts to the network of small accounts in false names and 
over the course of three days withdrew about US$3 to US$4 
million dollars from ATMs in more than 5,000 withdrawals in 
different regions of South Africa. 
Inside information is also essential in the schemes involving 
Subscriber Identification Module (SIM) swap frauds. In these 
schemes, fraudsters obtain sufficient details of a bank client who 
operates his bank account via a mobile phone and fraudulently 
request a SIM swap at the mobile phone provider. They use the 
swapped SIM to intercept and divert the randomly generated 
security passwords that are linked to the account. This enables 
them to operate the client’s account and divert funds without the 
client receiving account activity alerts from the bank.58  
Cybercrime is, of course, very relevant to the providers of 
mobile money services. Mobile money services require a wide 
range of stakeholders to cooperate closely. To prevent 
vulnerabilities due to different security practices, standardization is 
required. One example of security standardization is the model of 
58 Hidden Price of a Banking Scam, OMBUDSMAN FOR BANKING SERVICES 
NEWS & MEDIA RELEASES, July 20, 2009, available at http://www.obssa.co.za/ 
news/2009_0720_banking_scam.htm. 
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the Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council. The 
Council was formed in 2006 by American Express, Discover 
Financial Services, JCB International, MasterCard Worldwide, and 
Visa Inc., to formulate open industry standards for global payment 
security.59 The Council has more than 600 global participating 
organizations representing industry stakeholders around the 
world.60 The Council’s standards range from management of 
security to technical matters regarding software and encryption. 
While standards such as these are crucial for the secure 
development of mass services, they challenge regulators to 
understand and evaluate the standards and their implementation by 
regulated institutions. They also require regulators to be vigilant to 
ensure that standards and requirements are proportional and do not 
unnecessarily limit market entry. 
 
B.  Privacy and Surveillance 
 
One of the key objectives of the AML/CTF framework is to 
ensure law enforcement access to financial information of clients. 
While law enforcement and anti-crime social benefits of financial 
transparency is recognized,61 it is important to be sensitive to 
potential abuse of financial information as well. An appropriate 
framework must be in place to ensure that the global movement to 
increase access to financial information is not abused by national 
governments to increase their access to private information.  
The FATF standards are not designed to protect client 
information against inappropriate access and usage by government 
59 About the PCI Security Standards Council, OFFICIAL PCI SECURITY 
STANDARDS COUNCIL SITE, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org.  
60 The Future of Money: How Mobile Payments Could Change Financial 
Services: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, 
112th Cong. 2 (2012) (statement of Troy Leach, Chief Tech. Officer, Payment 
Card Indus. Sec. Standards Council LLC), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HHRG-112-BA-WState-
TLeach-20120322.pdf.  
61 See, e.g., Princess Máxima, U.N. Secretary General’s Special Advocate, 
Address to the FATF Plenary (June 23, 2010), available at 
https://www.fic.gov.za/DownloadContent/RESOURCES/GUIDELINES/keynot
e%20address%20by%20H%20R%20H%20Princess%20Máxima.pdf. 
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agencies. This is not the purpose of these standards. However, if 
the current move towards transparency of financial information to 
government is not counter-balanced by appropriate controls, the 
AML/CFT standards may give some governments an excuse to 
invade privacy for their own political purposes. 
This type of abuse is difficult to prove, but there are indications 
that concern is justified. A number of allegations have been made 
regarding selective implementation of AML/CTF laws against 
political opponents or to pursue other policy objectives.62 In 
addition, many countries lack sufficient and effective protective 
measures to prevent such abuse. The governance structures of 
some FIUs, for example, are not sufficiently robust to protect them 
from abuse for political purposes. The Egmont Group, a select 
group of national FIUs, and the World Bank undertook a survey in 
2008 to probe aspects of FIU governance. Sixty-five FIUs 
participated in the survey, and the results provide grounds for 
concern.63 While many FIUs appear to meet basic good 
62 “On the political level, two common problems frequently hinder efficient 
implementation of AML/CFT regimes in post-communist countries. The first is 
‘selective implementation’ – that is, using AML/CFT laws to target political 
opponents. The other problem is ‘political risk.’ This means, governments and 
individual decision-makers adopting strong AML/CFT measures take the risk of 
being forced out of office by actors who prefer to maintain the unregulated 
status quo. Certain cases in Central Asia may illustrate ‘selective 
implementation.’” Elias Götz & Michael Jonsson, Political Factors Affecting 
AML/CFT Efforts in Post-Communist Eurasia: The Case of Georgia, 12 J. OF 
MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 59, 68 (2009).  
“Moreover, since the enactment of Chinese AML Provisions (2003), the 
main victims were those destroyed underground banks in the coastal regions of 
the Southeast China. Chinese critics claimed that the People’s Bank of China 
was using AML legislations to assist state-owned commercial banks keeping 
their monopolistic positions in the financial markets.” Jun Tang & Lishan Ai, 
Combating Money Laundering in Transition Countries: The Inherent 
Limitations and Practical Issues, 13 J. OF MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 215, 
219 (2010). See also David Chaikin & Jason Sharman, APG/FATF Anti-
Corruption/AML/CFT 18-13, 69-72 (FATF/APG, Research Paper, 2007), 
available at http://www.apgml.org/issues/docs/17/APG-FATF_Report_on_Anti-
Corruption_AML.pdf. 
63 Louis de Koker, Applying Anti-Money Laundering Laws to Fight 
Corruption, in HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN 
CORRUPTION 351-52 (Adam Graycar & Russell G. Smith eds., 2011).  
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governance requirements, a significant number do not meet these 
requirements and may therefore be vulnerable to political 
influence. For example, a significant number of the heads of FIUs 
(for example, 46 percent of the heads of administrative FIUs) are 
appointed by a minister, cabinet, or head of state. Additionally, 34 
percent are appointed to fixed terms of office, while 62 percent do 
not have fixed terms. In more than half of the respondent FIUs, 
some other state body or judicial authority has access to the FIU’s 
data holdings, while 62 percent reported that they can (or must) 
disclose their findings or the results of their analyses to a superior 
authority (for example a ministry, government, or supervisory 
authority). It is encouraging that the new Recommendation 29 and 
its Interpretive Note seek to strengthen the autonomy of an FIU 
and the security and confidentiality of its information. 
Improvements will however take time to effect and in some 
countries may prove less effective than hoped. 
In the mobile money context, the powerful access mechanisms 
of the AML/CTF framework and relatively weak anti-abuse and 
privacy protection mechanisms converge with the powerful data-
generating and capturing ability of mobile telecommunications. 
Communication data reveal the views and social patterns of users. 
Mobile phone handsets can act as tracking devices enabling the 
tracing and location of users. Where the phone is used for financial 
services, the data is enriched by the payment and spending pattern 
of the user. In the past few years, an increasing number of 
developing countries imposed SIM-card registration requirements 
to ensure that users of mobile phone services are identified. Mobile 
phone service providers must identify and verify their contract and 
non-contract clients in processes that mirror AML/CTF client 
identification requirements. The policy objective behind these 
registration requirements is to use the data for law enforcement 
purposes and to prevent the abuse of these services by criminals. 
The data generated through mobile phone usage is therefore linked 
to a specific individual and can potentially provide a rich profile of 
that user. 
A Wikileaks/International Privacy release of a cache of 
documents in 2011 showed that many large software companies 
have developed and marketed mass surveillance software to 
governments, including undemocratic and oppressive regimes. The 
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software enables governments to combine, manage and mine 
different sources of mass surveillance data and has been employed 
in relation to mobile phone usage as well.64  
South Africa, one of the leading financial inclusion 
jurisdictions, stands accused of extensive intelligence surveillance 
of communications, both legal and, allegedly, illegal.65 Despite a 
modern constitution and rule of law, indications are that 
communications are intercepted for political purposes. Leaked 
recordings of taped telephone discussions of prosecutors, for 
example, scuttled the corruption prosecution of the current 
president of South Africa. South African mobile phone service 
providers have furthermore not been protective of client privacy 
when law enforcement requests information, sometimes releasing 
information on the promise that due legal processes will be 
followed and providing data of clients who are not subject to any 
criminal investigation.66  
64 WIKILEAKS – THE SPY FILES, http://wikileaks.org/the-spyfiles.html. 
65 “[T]he National Communications Centre (NCC) [is] an obscure, high tech 
facility set up in Gauteng during the 1990s. By 2008 it boasted a staff 
complement of some 300. The NCC’s telecommunications and computer 
equipment can intercept and analyse [sic] large volumes of voice and [I]nternet 
traffic, both indiscriminately by listening for keywords, and in a targeted way by 
focusing on individual phone numbers, email addresses and even voice prints. 
To date, the NCC has operated outside the bounds of national legislation, 
including the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act (Rica), which allows interception only 
with a judge's warrant. The NCC, has relied on the loophole that it supposedly 
intercepts ‘foreign’ communications only, which is not regulated by domestic 
law. However, in practice the NCC has defined ‘foreign signals’ to include 
cross-border communications where one of the parties is in South Africa and the 
other abroad. And because of the globalized nature of [I]nternet traffic, many 
emails, voice-over-internet conversations and communication via social media 
such as Facebook and Twitter - even if both end parties are in South Africa - 
would also be susceptible.” Drew Forrest & Stefaans Brümmer, Spooks Bid for 
New Powers, MAIL & GUARDIAN, Feb. 3, 2012, available at http://mg.co.za/ 
article/2012-02-03-spies-bid-for-new-powers. 
66 This approach elicited a very strong judicial comment in S. v. Agliotti 
2011 (2) SACR 437 (GSJ) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/ 
cases/ZAGPJHC/2010/129.html, an organized crime prosecution that failed, 
amongst others because the integrity of mobile phone records was questionable. 
The evidence revealed a cooperative and informal relationship between the 
  
                                                                                                             
 
2013] THE 2012 REVISED FATF RECOMMENDATIONS 195 
AML/CFT systems can provide information that supports 
appropriate law enforcement. Mobile money can improve the lives 
of millions of vulnerable people in developing countries. However, 
the good that these systems can do should not blind us to the 
potential for abuse and the need for appropriate controls. Lack of 
protection and lack of trust, on the other hand, may undermine the 
usage of mobile money. For a variety of reasons, new users of 
formal financial services often continue to use informal services in 
parallel. Where users believe that their transactions may be 
monitored to their detriment, they may withdraw from formal 
services or use it only for transactions that can be monitored 
without any negative result for them.67 Such conduct would 
continue to sustain the grey economy and undermine the pro-
forensic investigators of telecommunications operators and law enforcement. It 
highlighted instances where records were provided before due legal process was 
followed; where large amounts of data were provided with no official being able 
to account for the whereabouts or the use of the records; and the request and 
provision of records of persons who had no involvement in criminal conduct, 
including the records of the senior and highly respected counsel of the defense: 
Judge Kgomo commented as follows:  
Abuse of the system by the police was demonstrated by Hodes 
SC during cross-examination of these cellphone ‘experts’. For 
example, he elicited evidence to the effect that cellphone 
records of the accused’s attorney; himself, Hodes SC, 
accused’s counsel herein; his (Hodes’) father’s, also an 
advocate who has nothing to do with this case; other clients of 
accused’s counsel, Hodes SC like one Peter Skeet; phones of 
private attorneys’ firms and private investigator Warren 
Goldblatt; among many others, were subpoenaed and obtained 
by the police from the cellphone companies. This elicited a 
question from me at one stage to the effect whether if and 
when this country’s State President’s phone records were 
subpoenaed, whether they (the cellphone companies) would 
issue them out without much ado. The answer was that those 
records would be extracted and handed over without asking 
another question. It is my considered view that if this state of 
affairs did occur or does occur and is allowed to persist, WE 
SHOULD ALL BE AFRAID, VERY AFRAID!!!  
Id. 
67 Louis de Koker & Nicola Jentzsch, Financial Inclusion and Financial 
Integrity: Aligned Incentives? 18 (July 2011) (unpublished conference paper, 
Univ. of Münster), available at http://dro.deakin.edu.au/view/DU:30041719. 
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financial inclusion objectives of the FATF. Abusive practices will 
also undermine the usage of mobile money when users discover 
that their service providers shared damaging information that 
exposed users to government repression. 
Thus, appropriate protection of financial information should 
receive more attention. Greater emphasis on privacy and 
circumspection about the quality of governance in countries where 
mobile money projects are launched will assist in protecting the 
integrity of mobile money. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mobile money holds much promise for the developing world. 
However, it holds both good and bad. The FATF’s attention is 
presently focused on the integrity consequences of mobile money 
within its limited objectives of AML/CFT/PF. The FATF, 
regulators and service providers still have some way to go before 
clarity is reached about appropriate mobile money and risk 
assessment and mitigation. However, there are also broader 
integrity issues that are relevant to providers, consumers and 
society at large that should be reflected in risk management 
practices to ensure that mobile money functions with integrity in 
all developing countries. 
 
  
